In the ongoing war on terror both the American and Israeli governments have resorted to a policy of ‘targeting terrorists’. In essence, both governments authorize their military or intelligence services to kill specific ‘terrorists’ who they believe mortally threaten citizens and cannot otherwise be neutralized. President Bush calls this ‘sudden justice’ and the Israeli government ‘targeted killing’ but their critics speak of ‘assassination’, ‘liquidation’ or ‘extra-judicial killing’. Since 11 September 2001, America is reported to have killed at least 44 people (...) without warning or trial under the guidance of this policy, at least 18 of whom were civilians; the Israelis have killed at least 348, including 120 unintended targets. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAmong the most forceful and provocative criticisms that have been leveled at US drone strikes against alleged terrorists far from conventional battlefields has been Jeremy Waldron's charge that they cannot be justified in terms of a neutral principle that most reasonable people would accept. In essence, Waldron asks ‘whether we are comfortable with [such a norm] in the hands of our enemies’. He thinks most people will say ‘no’ and that this is a reason not to embrace a permissive norm (...) in the first place. We will argue that a key assumption in Waldron's argument is highly contestable, and that if it is challenged, the whole argument can be turned inside out to provide support for a limited drone program aimed at terrorist leaders. In essence, if the suspected terrorists who are the targets of drone strikes are understood to be combatants rather than civilians, as the US government has forcefully argued that they should be, then the norm permitting strikes against them is the humanitarian principle.. (shrink)

Emotion theorists have long held that a fundamental characteristic of an emotion is how its constituent processes change and interact over time. Assessing these temporal dynamics of emotion in the brain is critical for understanding the neural representation of emotions as well as advancing theories of emotional processing. We review the neuroimaging research on three temporal dynamic features of emotion: time of onset, duration, and resurgence and show how assessing these temporal dynamics in the brain have led to improved understanding (...) of the structure and function of emotional processes such as revealing which appraisals come first, how emotional processing endures both explicitly and implicitly, and that the resurgence of emotional processing may consist of either single or multiple processes. (shrink)

Based on an earlier analysis that tries to show that existence is a real predicate, I now argue that Descartes’s dream and malicious demon arguments are fallacious. An object that stands external to me (i.e., that exists) is the one thing that I cannot produce by my dreams, and, on phenomenological grounds, I am immediately experiencing an existing object right now. Therefore, in accepting that it is a logical possibility that I am dreaming, either I illicitly conflate an existing object (...) and an object of a dream, or Descartes’s claimthat there are never any sure signs by which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep is a presupposed but unfounded premise. Similarly, Descartes’s malicious demon argument must also be rejected. (shrink)

Based on an earlier analysis that tries to show that existence is a real predicate, I now argue that Descartes’s dream and malicious demon arguments are fallacious. An object that stands external to me (i.e., that exists) is the one thing that I cannot produce by my dreams, and, on phenomenological grounds, I am immediately experiencing an existing object right now. Therefore, in accepting that it is a logical possibility that I am dreaming, either I illicitly conflate an existing object (...) and an object of a dream, or Descartes’s claimthat there are never any sure signs by which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep is a presupposed but unfounded premise. Similarly, Descartes’s malicious demon argument must also be rejected. (shrink)

My dissertation addresses the question "do desires provide reasons?" I present two independent lines of argument in support of the conclusion that they do not. The first line of argument emerges from the way I circumscribe the concept of a desire. Complications aside, I conceive of a desire as a member of a family of attitudes that have imperative content, understood as content that displays doability-conditions rather than truth-conditions. Moreover, I hold that an attitude may provide reasons only if it (...) has truth-evaluable content. Insofar as desires lack truth-evaluable content, I hold that the content of a desire has the wrong kind of logical structure to provide reasons. My second line of argument claims that even if a desire did have truth-evaluable content, it would not follow that desires provide reasons. This is because a desire has no more rational significance than a guess or coin-flip. My argument relies on what I call the non-substitutability principle, the thesis that (all things being equal) one cannot substitute something that lacks rational significance, relative to some attitude, A, for something that has rational significance, relative to A, and leave the rational standing of A unchanged. For example, one cannot substitute the guess that P (i.e., something that lacks rational significance relative to the belief that P) for the perception that P (i.e., something that is rationally significant relative to the belief that P) without altering the rational standing of the belief. I argue that when the non-substitutability principle is applied to a desire that gives rise to an intention, it turns out that one can always substitute a guess or coin-flip (i.e., something that lacks rational significance relative to the intention) for the desire, without altering the rational standing of the intention. I take this to show that desires are not rationally significant relative to the intentions to which they give. (shrink)

Cannabis sativa L. is grown and marketed under a large number of named strains. Strains are often associated with phenotypic traits of interest to consumers, such as aroma and cannabinoid content. Yet genetic inconsistencies have been noted within named strains. We asked whether genetically inconsistent samples of a commercial strain also display inconsistent aroma profiles. We genotyped 32 samples using variable microsatellite regions to determine a consensus strain genotype and identify genetic outliers for four strains. Results were used to select (...) 15 samples for olfactory testing. A genetic outlier sample was available for all but one strain. Aroma profiles were obtained by 55 sniff panelists using quantitative sensory evaluation of 40 odor descriptors. Within a strain, aroma descriptor frequencies for the genetic outlier were frequently at odds with those of the consensus samples. It appears that within-strain genetic differences are associated with differences in aroma profile. Because these differences were perceptible to untrained panelists, they may also be noticed by retail consumers. Our results could help the cannabis industry achieve better control of product consistency. (shrink)

Conventional economic theory assumes that people care only about ultimate outcomes and are indifferent to the decision and allocation processes by which outcomes are brought about. Building on Sen (1997), I relax this assumption, and investigate the formal and philosophical issues that arise. I extend the formal apparatus of preference theory to analyse how processes may enter preferences, and investigate whether traditional invariance requirements like the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference are still satisfied in this new setting. I show that (...) it is, provided certain conditions of separability hold, and I discuss the plausibility of these conditions. Further, I argue that processes are often valued in a mode that diverges from the conventional modes of instrumental and intrinsic/independent valuation. I introduce the notion of dependent non-instrumental valuation, and show how processes could depend on their instrumental function for their value – making their value dependent – and yet derive their value from something else – making it non-instrumental. Dependent non-instrumental value, I argue, can be explained by symbolic and evidential relations between processes and outcomes. (Published Online July 31 2007) Footnotes1 This article is based on the third chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation (Sandbu 2003). I would like to thank Richard Tuck for many discussions over several years, which helped me develop and elaborate the ideas presented here. I am also very grateful to Amartya Sen, Nien-hê Hsieh, Luc Bovens, and Xaq Pitkow for their close readings of various versions of the paper and their incisive comments, questions, and suggestions. Further thanks go to Christopher Avery, Matthias Benz, Jerry Green, Waheed Hussain, David Laibson, Robert Sugden, Alan Strudler, Justin Wolfers, and seminar participants at Harvard University and the Wharton School of Business. Akshay Jashnani provided helpful research assistance. Most of the ideas in the present article were developed while I was the recipient of a doctoral grant from the Research Council of Norway, which I gratefully acknowledge. (shrink)

"Neusner moves beyond the interpretation of individual texts to grasp as wholes two systems of Judaism, that of the Mishnah and that represented by Rabbinic documents of the fifth century. He thus provides an entirely fresh approach and a new answer to the central question 'What is Judaism?' At the same time, by providing a sound model for the evaluation and comparison of diverse religious systems, this book has an important place within the study of the history of religions in (...) general."--Alan J. Avery-Peck, author of The Talmud of the Land of Israel: Shebiit An eminent scholar of the history of Judaism, Jacob Neusner shows in this work how Judaism changed from a philosophy to a religion between 200 and 400 C.E. The Transformation of Judaism is a work both revolutionary in its method and unprecedented in its results. Comparing earlier and later sets of Judaic writings, Neusner sets forth how philosophy--abstract, elegant, orderly, and intellectual--turned into religion--tangible, down-to-earth, chaotic, and concrete. In the process, he offers an account of the birth of Judaism that has become normative. Moreover, Neusner's methodology can be applied to the study of religions other than Judaism because it examines the underpinnings of how a society sees the world (philosophy), orders itself (politics), and sustains itself (economics). "This prolific author provides in this book yet another of his clear and scholarly explorations into the nature of Judaism... Scholarly detail does not preclude clarity of style and more general reflection on the character of religion in relation to other modes of thought."--Peter Byrne, Religious Studies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dei Filius IV:On Faith and ReasonCajetan Cuddy, O.P.In this essay, we will examine the presentation of faith and reason in the fourth chapter of the First Vatican Council's dogmatic constitution Dei Filius.1 Our examination focuses primarily on the intelligibility of the constitution's exposition of faith and reason in its fourth chapter. Secondarily it looks for the implications that this intelligible teaching bears for Catholic thought in our own contemporary (...) moment.To achieve this twofold finality, we will divide our essay into four parts. The first will identify what makes this chapter textually unique in relation to the three chapters that precede it. In light of chapter 4's textual distinctiveness, we will then attempt, in the second part, to unpack what we suggest is the speculative foundation of the constitution's presentation of faith and reason. Thirdly, we will examine how this speculative foundation serves the document's integrated account of faith and reason. Fourthly, we will conclude with a summary of the chapter's integrated account of faith and reason with an eye towards its theocentric orientation.The late Avery Cardinal Dulles once observed that "without actually mentioning Thomas Aquinas, Vatican I endorsed his [Aquinas's] position" on faith and reason.2 Our analysis of Dei Filius IV will largely proceed [End Page 873] along Thomistic lines. Although we recognize that one need not be a Thomist in order to profit from a study of Dei Filius, we do believe that Aquinas's teaching about faith and reason helps to illumine its central themes.What Makes Dei Filius IV ("On Faith and Reason") Unique?We begin our study of faith and reason in Dei Filius with a question: What makes chapter 4 unique when considered in relation to the whole of Dei Filius?In order to answer this question, we note that Dei Filius comprises six main parts: a prologue, four chapters, and a series of canons (divided into discrete groups associated with particular chapters).3 According to their respective titles, the first chapter is about God, the creator of all things (De Deo rerum omnium creatore). The second chapter is about revelation (De revelatione). The third chapter is about faith particularly (De fide). And the fourth chapter is about faith and reason together (De fide et ratione).Dei Filius, unsurprisingly, refers to "God" (the subject of chapter 1) in each of its five other parts. It references "revelation" (the subject of chapter 2) in chapters 2–4 and in the canons associated with chapters 2–4. "Revelation" is thus absent only in the prologue and in the first chapter. The subject of chapter 3 (i.e., "faith") appears in the prologue, in chapters 2–4, and in the canons associated with chapters 3–4. Finally, the constitution references "reason" in the prologue, in chapters 2–4, and in each group of canons.This terminological recurrence reflects the constitution's integrity. Each individual chapter coheres with the other parts that precede and (or) follow it. This cohesion, however, can occlude the precise formal distinction between chapters 3 and 4. Both of these final two chapters treat of faith. The third chapter considers faith while the fourth chapter considers faith in relation to reason. Consequently, we might be tempted to identify reason as the specific difference between chapter 3 and chapter [End Page 874] 4. This suggestion has merit. Reason does receive unique consideration in the fourth chapter. Nonetheless, as we have already noted, chapter 3 also mentions "reason" (as does every other part of Dei Filius except chapter 1).4 From these considerations, chapters 2–4 each appear to treat of "faith and reason" in some way and to some degree.5Again, we ask our question: What makes Dei Filius IV unique when compared to the constitution as a whole? And thus far a clear answer to our question does not immediately appear. Given that the conciliar fathers deemed the subject "faith and reason" worthy of a separate chapter, however, we reasonably assume that chapter 4 does contribute something proper and distinctive to its subject.6 This proper and distinctive contribution is the object of our inquiry.We propose that the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives. Edited by FRANCIS SCHUSSLER FIORENZA and JOHN P. GALVIN. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991. Vol. 1: Pp. xv+ 336. Vol. 2: Pp. xv+ 384. $21.95 each; $39.95 set. Not too long ago a fellow Dominican who wanted to do some personal updating and retooling in theology asked me to recommend to him some hooks in Catholic systematics which would show him the lay of (...) the land in contemporary theology. I was happy to be able to apprise him of the two volumes under review. Most of the essayists do not explore new territory or establish new beachheads (nor was this their task) hut instead skillfully sketch the revised maps of terra cognita and graciously occupy already conquered lands, sometimes repeating their own creative work published elsewhere. Without doubt the majority of the Catholic theological guild who belong to the College Theology Society or the Catholic Theological Society of America would recognize in the overall thrust and import of these articles a broad harmony with the main themes and general methodology of contemporary Catholic theology, while they would also acknowledge in the articles' various emphases and organizational techniques the legitimate pluralistic expressions of that theology. In e:ffect, the authors offer, in a balanced and evenhanded way, albeit from their own individual perspectives (hence the subtitle), a rich distillation and compact presentation of the state of contemporary Catholic theology as it is probably taught by the majority of professors in North America. The editors see the volumes as opening up the diverse theological perspectives within Roman Catholic systematic theology, hut as the list of authors reveals, these perspectives actually cluster within the moderate center-to-left-of-center spectrum of contemporary Catholic theology : Systematic Theology: Tasks and Methods (Fiorenza); Faith and Revelation (Avery Dulles) ; Approaching the Christian Understanding.of God (David Tracy) ; The Trinitarian Mystery of God (Catherine Mowry LaCugna); Creation (Anne M. Clifford); Jesus Christ (Galvin); Church (Michael A. Fahey); Sin and Grace (Roger Haight); Saints and Mary (Elizabeth A. Johnson) ; Sacraments in General, Baptism and Confirmation, Penance, Anointing of the Sick (Regis A. Duffy); Eucharist, Order (David N. Power); Marriage (Fiorenza); Eschatology (Monika K. Hellwig). The traditional topics in the traditional order reveal that the volumes 305 306 BOOK REVIEWS are meant to serve as a summary and survey of the major courses of· fered within most Master of Arts and Master of Divinity programs. The intended audience is the beginning student, the student who needs to review the major themes of systematic theology, and the student who needs some updating in contemporary theology. In my opinion, the best articles for the intended audience and purpose are those hy Fior· enza (Systematic Theology), Dulles, Galvin, Haight and Johnson. The editors asked the authors to bear in mind five specific goals: to root their work in Roman Catholic theology; to help recover, in Rahner 's words, " the forgotten truths " of Catholicism, by displaying how historical studies have uncovered heretofore neglected traditions; to make use of current hermeneutical theories and philosophical reflections ; to take into account the ecumenical dimension of theology, while also clarifying the distinctive Roman Catholic position on various topics; and to he attentive to the current stress on praxis. In general, whenever their topic required it, the authors have fulfilled these goals. What has resulted is a combined work deeply grounded in historical understanding which is ecumenically broad while also distinctively Roman Catholic. The articles have tended to retrieve Catholicism's forgotten truths from the church's patristic era, since the dominant tradition until Vatican II was the one defined by the high Middle Ages and Trent. Indicative of this trend is the fact that, among the brief annotated bibliographies appended to each essay, only those by Dulles and Haight contain a work by Thomas Aquinas-and in Dulles's opinion the treatment of faith in the Summa theologiae is " stilil the most authoritative and incisive Catholic treatise on faith" (I :128). Never· theless, the authors are fair in giving medieval theology its rightful place within the Catholic tradition. Instead of offering even the briefest summary of the seventeen individual essays, since the aui:hors' basic introductory treatment of their topics... (shrink)

This paper sets forth a familiar theme, that science essentially consists of two interdependent episodes, one imaginative, the other critical. Hypotheses and other imaginative conjectures are the initial stage of scientific inquiry because they provide the incentive to seek the truth and a clue as to where to find it. But scientific conjectures must be subject to critical examination and empirical testing. There is a dialogue between the two episodes; observations made to test a hypothesis are the inspiration for new (...) conjectures. Inductive generalizations may also inspire hypotheses, but cannot validate them. A hypothesis is empirically tested by ascertaining whether or not predictions about the world of experience deduced from the hypothesis agree with what is actually observed. This has been appropriately considered the 'criterion of demarcation' that distinguishes science from other knowledge. But scientific hypotheses must satisfy other tests as well, e.g., whether they have explanatory value and further understanding. I briefly explore such issues as verifiability and falsifiability, empirical content and truthfulness, contingency and certainty, fact and theory, error and fraud. Science like any human activity is subject to error and to the foibles and other failings of human beings. But severe attempts of empirical falsification and other trials yield knowledge that stands the test of time and provides a foothold for further knowledge. Moreover, scientists have developed social mechanisms, such as peer review and publication, to evaluate their work. Because the research of scientists depends on the validity of previous knowledge, it is of great consequence that they discern valid from invalid knowledge and thus scientists are inclined to transcend ideology, nationality, friendship, monetary interest and other prejudices when the mettle of scientific knowledge is at stake. I use historical examples to illustrate some relevant aspects of scientific practice: its success (Mendel), misrepresentation (Darwin), ideological abuse (Lysenko), arrogant violation of the requirement of testing (Koch), theory replacement (Priestly and Lavoisier, Newton and Einstein), and the indispensability of context (Oswald Avery and Alfred Wegener). (shrink)

The puzzle of cross-modal shape experience is the puzzle of reconciling the apparent differences between our visual and haptic experiences of shape with their apparent similarities. This paper proposes that we can resolve the cross-modal puzzle by reflecting on another puzzle. The puzzle of perspectival character challenges us to reconcile the variability of shape experience through shifts in perspective with its constancy. An attractive approach to the latter puzzle holds that shape experience is complex, involving both perspectival aspects and constant (...) aspects. I argue here that parallel distinctions between perspectival and constant aspects of shape experience arise in sight and touch, and that perspectival aspects are modality-specific while at least some constant aspects are constitutively multisensory. I then address a powerful challenge to the idea that aspects of spatial phenomenology are shared cross-modally. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:METHOD DIVORCED FROM CONTENT IN THEOLOGY? AN ASSESSMENT OF LONERGAN'S METHOD IN THEOLOGY TERRENCE REYNOLDS Brown University Providence, Rhode Island IN IDS INTRODUCTION to Method in Theology, Bernard Lonergan flatly maintains that he intends to· write not theology but only method in theology.1 He therefore proposes.to concern himself solely with the operations theologians perform and to suspend consideration of the objects they seek to expound. He is looking for (...) "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results." 2 To arrive at his method, Lonergan relies upon the cognitional theory which he ha,d outlined with great sophistication in Insight. He argues that the dynamism of the human mind and the principles of its operations as revealed by introspective psycihology lead to a model of the nature of scientific method in general and, by extension, to method in theology. It is through the transcendental method that Lonergan discovers in the procedures of the human mind the basic pattern of operations by which wl1l cognitiona1 activity takes plaice. This pattern, he maintains, yields cumulative results in thelogical inquiry as well as in any fie1d of investigation. He therefore intends to demonstrate that theology can be studied in the same manner as any other discipline. Critics have respectfully suggested that, while Lonergan's system is an imposing one, he has introduced unworkable and 1 Bernard Lonergan, Method 4ln Theology (New York, 1979), p. XII. 2 Lonergan, Method, p. 5. 245 246 TERRENCE REYNOLDS misleading distinctions into his work; in particular, he has fa~led to explicate his thoologiicaJ. p11emises and thereby leaves uTIJc!lear the presuppositions upon which his Method rests. Method, they argue, cannot be divorced from theology, and the p11ecise writing of the form.er cannot be carried out without attention to the latter. Avery Dulles, Mauri!Oe Wiles, and Anthony Ke1ly have all leveled the charge that Method suffers from this detaichment of method from content. The purpose of this essay wiH he to discuss Lonergan's achievement in Method in Theology but then to consider the extent to which his critics may be right. Um:Lerstanding Lonergan's methodologiical enterprise requires a familiarity with his cognitionrul theory as delineated in Jnsi,ght, for his complex theory of knowing establishes the anthropology upon whiJCh he grounds his Method. Basically, he pr:obes.for ·the answers to thl"ee questions: 1) What happens when we a11e knowing? 2) Why do we cal~ that knowing? and 3) What is known when that is happening? The ans1wer to the first question yie1ds his cognitionrul theory, the second his epistemology,.and the thi11d his met:aphysics.3 Since •all knowing is a quest.for explanaition, founded upon the ass111mption of the intelligibility of the universe, the on-going search for explanation in the finite sphere implies a finail e:q>i1anation and this is be[ng itseH. In apprehending the processes of cognition, one can begin to recognize the means by which the search for·this reality is universally conducted: Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all that there is to be understood, but you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.4 a Lonergan, Method, p. 25. 4 Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York, 1957), p. XVIII. Lonergan's cognitional theory draws from the work of Thomas and Kant but moves creatively beyond them in his emphasis upon the dynamism of the human mind and the nature of the reality it perceives and comes to know. For Kant, to whom Lonergan's work is often compared, the mind imposes a conceptual framework and an intelligible order upon that which it seeks to understand METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY Lonergan's use of introspective psychology reveals four levds in human consciousness, the empir1ca1, the intellectual, the rationa1l, and the moml. The empirical ~eveJ. concentrates upon experience itself and involves the hasic questioning and intel"est in one's surroundings which all subsequent self-transcende1J1ce presupposes. It is " experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding." 5 Intellectual consciousness considers the elements passed on to it as " unknown " by... (shrink)

Neste artigo, faço críticas às críticas tecidas por John Rawlscontra o utilitarismo, compreendido como teoria política, em seu livroA Theory of Justice. Esforçar-me-ei por mostrar que, ainda que outilitarismo considere a maximização da felicidade como o critério dedistinção das instituições políticas corretamente ordenadas, isso nãosignifica que ele seja indiferente a questões de justiça distributiva.Buscarei mostrar que o utilitarismo incorpora tais princípios de justiça,porque o modo como a felicidade é distribuída determina a proporçãoem que ela pode ser produzida. Além disso, como (...) veremos, as críticasfeitas por Rawls estão fundadas numa concepção extremamenteempobrecida do princípio da prudência racional, a qual ele injustamenteatribui ao seu opositor. Não obstante, também buscarei mostrar quedeterminadas críticas feitas por Rawls estão na direção correta, a saberaquelas que, em oposição ao utilitarismo, apresentam a liberdade, enão a felicidade, como constituidora do bem incondicional que deveser justamente distribuído.In this paper, I criticize the criticisms that John Rawls developsagainst the Utilitarianism, understood as a political theory, in his bookA Theory of Justice. I would like to show that, although theUtilitarianism takes the maximization of happiness as the criterion ofrightly ordered political institutions, it does not mean that it cannot bevery sensitive to questions of distributive justice. I will show that theUtilitarianism embeds such principles of justice, because the way happiness is distributed determines the proportion in which it can beproduced. Moreover, as we will see, Rawls criticisms are based on avery poorly conception of rational prudence that he then unfairlyattributes to his opponent. Nevertheless, I will also show that Rawlscriticism is in the right way, when he asserts, in opposition to theUtilitarianism, that freedom, instead of happiness, is the unconditionalgood that should be rightly distributed. (shrink)

We propose a new approach for tracing value change. Value change may lead to a mismatch between current value priorities in society and the values for which technologies were designed in the past, such as energy technologies based on fossil fuels, which were developed when sustainability was not considered a very important value. Better anticipating value change is essential to avoid a lack of social acceptance and moral acceptability of technologies. While value change can be studied historically and qualitatively, we (...) propose a more quantitative approach that uses large text corpora. It uses probabilistic topic models, which allow us to trace values that are latent. We demonstrate the approach for five types of value change in technology. Our approach is useful for testing hypotheses about value change, such as verifying whether value change has occurred and identifying patterns of value change. The approach can be used to trace value change for various technologies and text corpora, including scientific articles, newspaper articles, and policy documents. (shrink)

Edited by leading experts in contemporary environmental philosophy, this anthology features the best available selections that cover the full range of positions within this rapidly developing field. Divided into four sections that delve into the vast issues of contemporary Eco-philosophy, the Fourth Edition now includes a section on Continental Environmental Philosophy that explores current topics such as the social construction of nature, and eco-phenomenology. Each section is introduced and edited by a leading philosopher in the field. For professionals with a (...) career within the environmental field including law, politics, conservation, geography, and biology. (shrink)

Human engagement with imaginary worlds pervades history (e.g., Paleolithic cave paintings) and development (e.g., 18-month-olds pretend). In providing a safe environment, separate from the real world, fiction offers the opportunity for simulated exploration regardless of external circumstances. Thus, engagement with imaginary worlds in fiction may afford individuals opportunities to reap benefits and transfer these benefits back to the real world.

The fact that genes and environment contribute differentially to variation in human behaviors, traits and attitudes is central to the field of behavior genetics. Perceptions about these differential contributions may affect ideas about human agency. We surveyed two independent samples (N = 301 and N = 740) to assess beliefs about free will, determinism, political orientation, and the relative contribution of genes and environment to 21 human traits. We find that lay estimates of genetic influence on these traits cluster into (...) four distinct groups, which differentially predict beliefs about human agency, political orientation, and religiosity. Despite apparent ideological associations with these beliefs, the correspondence between mean lay estimates and published heritability estimates for the surveyed traits is large (r = .77). Belief in genetic determinism emerges as a modest predictor of accuracy in these lay estimates. Additionally, educated mothers with multiple children emerge as particularly accurate in their estimates of the genetic contribution to these traits. (shrink)

The target articles in this special section shed new light on the old question whether and how emotions influence action. However, what is missing is a straightforward motivational analysis—considering what we have learned from the science of explaining the “why” and “how” of behavior. I posit that emotions can influence the motivation process and thus action by fulfilling at least three functions: First, being grounded in needs, experienced emotions can function as strong need-like motivational states. Second, anticipated emotions can function (...) as incentives and justify action. Third, emotions can inform about progress in goal pursuit permitting behavior calibration. In summary, there is little doubt that emotions influence action. They can do so because they are hypo-phenomena of motivation. (shrink)

The Anglican Thirty Nine Articles join catholic Christendom in affirming that: There is but one living and true God…and in unity of this Godhead there be three Persons of one substance, power, and eternity; the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.